Have a business dispute with no contract? Today we will be drafting a complaint based on negative electronic communications that caused a commercial tenant to be forced to relocate.  A good business litigation paralegal has to be adept with California procedural practice guides when drafting pleadings.  There are many causes of action that require special attention to detail when drafting.  Today we will be discussing the elements of intentional interference with prospective business advantage: 1. Existing prospective relationship, 2. Probability of future benefit, 3. Injurious interference, 4. Wrongful conduct, 5. Knowledge and intent, and 6. Causation and damage (very important with no contract).

A cause of action exists for intentional interference with another’s prospective business advantage if the defendant disrupts or diverts the business relationship by improper methods which fall outside the boundaries of fair competition. Baldwin v. Marina City Props., Inc., 79 Cal.App. 3D 393, 406.

Existing Relationship:

To state cause of action for interference with prospective business advantage, the plaintiff must show an existing business relationship or the existence of a “prospective business relationship.”

There must have been a “probability of future economic benefit.”

Injurious Interference:

There must be some showing that injurious interference did, in fact, occur.

The defendant must have engaged in wrongful conduct, separate from the interference itself, that falls outside the boundaries of fair competition. Baldwin v. Marina

The defendant must have known of and intended to interfere with another’s prospective business advantage. Ramona Manor Convalescent Hosp. v. Care Centers.

Causation and Damages:

Causation and damages are particularly important because of the absence of a contractual relationship. Itolad Music, Inc. v. April Music, Inc.

Often I ask pro per litigants:  ”Why do the steep learning curve to become a paralegal for just your one case?”  You often need a legal document assistant or paralegal to spot little details that it takes years to learn about.  Litigation has to be done right the first time.  It always takes more time to correct and amend an incorrect pleading than it does to properly draft and file your legal documents and court forms the first time.

My goal is to help the pro per litigant move the legal documents along in an even flow.

If the defendant has not previously appeared in the action, filing a motion to strike the complaint constitutes a general appearance (thus subjecting the defendant to the court’s personal jurisdiction). (CCP Section 1014).

Prevents entry of default so long as the motion is timely filed. A motion to strike any pleading must be filed within the time allowed to respond to a pleading—e.g., 30 days after service of the complaint or cross-complaint.

The court may also strike a pleading upon own motion. I’ve seen judges strike improper punitive damages from complaints right from the bench.

Where there are grounds both for demurring and moving to strike, the two procedures are normally filed together because they must be noticed for the same hearing. The motion to strike and the demurrer have to be two separate pleadings, however they must be heard concurrently on the same date.

GROUNDS FOR STRIKING A PLEADING:

-False pleadings. CCP Section 436 allows a motion to strike on the ground that the pleadings contain “irrelevant, false or improper matter” or where the pleadings are drawn in violation of a law, rule, or court order.

-Not drawn in conformity with court orders.

-Violation of deadline or requirement of prior leave of court.

-Answer filed without verification where complaint was verified.

-Answer for corporation filed by non-lawyer. (I get this one a lot)

-Conclusionary allegations.

-Improper demands or damage claims.

-Unauthorized attorneys fees claims.

-Punitive damages claims. (Very common mistake to put dollar amount of punitives in complaint)

-Prior court order required.

-Not legally recoverable.

-Improper rent claims in unlawful detainer actions

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

A motion for judgment on the pleadings has the same function as a general demurrer but is made after the time for demurrer has expired. The same rules that govern demurrers apply to motions for judgment on the pleadings.

Statutory Basis:

California Code of Civil Procedure Section 438 became effective in 1994 and sets forth grounds and procedures for the motion. Before 1994 there was no statutory basis for this motion, although its use was well recognized by case law.

CCP 438 imposes major limitations on the motion; e.g., it does not lie on grounds previously raised by demurrer unless there has been a material change in the law. It also imposes time limitations, which may be meaningless, since there are no such case law limitations on time.

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself” Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 CA4th 644, 650.

Motion by Party or Court:

A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made by any party to the action or by the court sua sponte. CCP 438(b)(2)

Time for Motion:

A defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made after the time for demur has expired and an answer has been filed. CCP 438(f)

Grounds:

A motion for judgment on the pleadings by defendant can be made on the ground that:

–The court “lacks jurisdiction of the subject of one or more of the causes of action”; or

–The complaint “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.” CCP 438(c).

Ground must appear on face of complaint or from facts judicially noticable. Hunt v. County of Shasta

An examination of a judgment debtor or third party is the postjudgment equivalent of a deposition.  An examination can be used tno identify property in the possession of control of the judgment debtor or a third person (e.g., a nondebtor spouse or parent!)  Are you excited? I am.  Think of the creative possibilities of who you could bring in to court.  Imperial Bank v. Pim.  I learned this one from a law school drop out like myself who worked for a car rental outfit on Lankershim Blvd.  When some rich kid would wreck a Mustang he would drag the kid’s parent’s into court after he got his default judgment.  Third party Debtor’s hearings can make the money appear.

Lien Created

Service of an examination order on the judgment debtor generally creates a one-year lien on all of the debtor’s non-exempt personal property whether or not it is in the debtor’s possession and control.  California Code of Civil Procedure Section 708.110(d)

Personally Serve the Order

A copy of the order: http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ej125.pdf must be personally served at least 10 days before the hearing.  This form is mandatory and fairly self-explanatory.

Here is a sample petition, or motion to compel arbitration in credit card lawsuit:

DEFENDANT JAME JAMES’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND TO STAY ACTION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff GENERIC BANK ENTITY, and Defendant JAME JAMES entered into a consumer credit agreement with both parties to arbitrate any dispute. The arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1281.2; 9 U.S.C. § 4. Nonetheless, Plaintiff has filed its action in Superior Court in direct contravention to the terms of its own contract of adhesion containing the arbitration agreement. Accordingly, Defendant requests that the Court compel plaintiff to arbitrate its claims and stay this action pending arbitration pursuant to the California Arbitration Act (“CAA”) and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 1281.2, 1281.4; 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4. Defendant also requests that the Court stay this action pending the resolution of this Motion. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1281.4.

II. RELEVANT FACTS

In applying for a VISA or MASTERCARD Defendant agreed to the terms of the “Customer Agreement and Disclosure Statement.” Declaration of JAME JAMES, Exhibit “A.” Page 10, ¶ 1 provides that:

“Binding Arbitration: Binding arbitration is a means of having an independent third party resolve a dispute without using the court system, judges or juries. Either of us may submit a dispute to binding arbitration at any reasonable time notwithstanding that a lawsuit or other proceeding has been commenced. If either of us fails to submit to binding arbitration following a lawful demand, the one who fails to submit bears all costs and expenses incurred by the other compelling arbitration.

Each arbitration, including the selection of the arbitrator(s) is administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA), according to the Commercial Arbitration Rules (excluding the Optional Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial Disputes) and the Optional Rules For Emergency Measures of Protection of the AAA (“AAA Rules”). To the extent that there is any variance between the AAA Rules and this Arbitration agreement, this Arbitration agreement shall control. Arbitrator(s) must be members of the state bar of the state where you reside with expertise in the substantive laws applicable to the subject matter of the dispute. Each of us agrees that in our relationship we are participating in transactions involving interstate commerce, and that each arbitration is governed by the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (Title 9 of the United States Code), and, to the extent any provision of that Act is inapplicable, unenforceable or invalid, the laws of the state of Nevada. To find out how to initiate an arbitration, please call any office of the AAA.”

Defendant verbally requested plaintiff to arbitrate, however plaintiff responded by filing the within lawsuit. Declaration of JAME JAMES, ¶ 3.

III. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Subject To A Valid Arbitration Agreement
“A written provision in any . . . contract . . . involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. In enacting the FAA, Congress intended to overcome courts’ reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements. See Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos. V. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 270. The FAA not only placed arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts but also established a federal policy in favor of arbitration. See Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph (2000) 531 U.S. 79, 90 (“Randolph”); Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1, 10. The FAA permits private parties to “trade the procedures . . . of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (1991) 500 U.S. 20, 31.

This “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” in effect creates “a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within coverage of the [FAA].” Perry, 482 U.S. at 489; see also Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 405. As such, the United States Supreme Court has warned against judicial rulings designed to erode FAA precedence “by indirection.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001) 532 U.S. 105, 122. Accordingly, it is the intent of Congress “to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of the court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp. (1983) 460 U.S. 1, 22 (emphasis added).

1. Supreme Court Authority Requires Enforcement of the Arbitration Policy.

In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (2002) 537 U.S. 79, 123 S.Ct. 588, the United States Supreme Court identified only two “gateway” issues that courts may decide: (1) “whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause”; and (2) “whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy.” Id. At 592. All other issues are for the arbitrator. Id. See also Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42 (1971) 4 Cal.3d 888, 892-893.

Howsam was applied in Pacificare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book (2003) 538 U.S. 401, 123 S.Ct. 1531 (“Pacificare”). There, the trial court ruled that an arbitration agreement was unenforceable because in the absence of arbitral authority to award punitive damages, the plaintiff would not be able to obtain meaningful relief. Id. at 1533-1534. The Supreme Court, however, concluded that because it did “not know the arbitrator will construe the remedial limitations [in the arbitration agreement], the questions whether they render the parties’ agreements unenforceable and whether it is for the courts or arbitrators to decide enforceability in the first instance are unusually abstract.” Id. at 1536. Therefore, “the proper course is to compel arbitration.” Id.

Thus, under Howsam and Pacificare, a court only answers two questions: (1) whether there is an agreement to arbitrate, and (2) whether the claims at issue are covered by the arbitration agreement. Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App 4th 955, 960. “The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor or arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or of an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense of arbitrability.” Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25; see also Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 320 (“Ericksen”); Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677, 687 (“Coast Plaza”).

2. In Interpreting the Terms of Wells Fargo’s Arbitration Agreement with James, Principles of State Contract Law Apply.

The FAA precludes states from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed “upon the same footing as other contracts.” Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto (1996) 517 U.S. 681, 687; Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971-972; Maggio v. Winward Capital Mgnt. (2000) 80 Cal.App4th 1210, 1214. Thus, the FAA requires that the courts enforce private agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms. Volt Info. Sciences v. Leland Stanford University. (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 478 (“Volt”); Dean Witter v. Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213, 219-220 (“Byrd”).

3. The Credit Card Company Agreed to Arbitrate its Claims

In moving to compel arbitration of THE CREDIT CARD COMPANY’s claims, James’s burden of proof is slight. JAMES only needs to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an agreement to arbitrate exists. Rosenthal, 14 Cal.4th at 413; Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218-219. To satisfy this burden, JAMES must supply a copy of the agreement or recite its terms in its motion. Cal.R.Ct. 371; Condee, 88 Cal.App.4th at 219. JAMES has done so here. WELLS FARGO agreed to arbitrate its claims when it drafted, solicited and then provided the “VISA or MasterCard CUSTOMER AGREEMENT AND DISCLOSURE STATEMENT” to JAMES. James Decal., EXHIBIT “A.”

4. Wells Fargo’s Claims Are Subject to Their Arbitration Agreements.
In determining whether WELLS FARGO’s claims are subject to arbitration, the threshold inquiry is an analysis of the contractual language. As the Supreme Court stated in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House (2002) 534 U.S. 279, 280 (“Waffle House”), “[A]bsent some ambiguity in the agreement . . . it is the language of the contract that defines the scope of the disputes subject to arbitration.” See also, Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. (1995) 514 U.S. 52, 57; Doctor’s Associates, Inc., 517 U.S. at 687. WELL’S FARGO’s disputes are among those expressly covered by the Arbitration Policy:

“Disputes: A dispute is any unresolved disagreement between you and us that relates in any way to accounts or services described in this Agreement. It includes any claim that arises out of or is related to these accounts, services or related agreements. It includes claims based on broken promises or contracts . . . A dispute also includes any disagreement about the meaning of this Arbitration agreement, and whether a disagreement is a “dispute” subject to binding arbitration as provided for in this Arbitration agreement. …Binding Arbitration: Binding arbitration is a means of having an independent third party resolve a dispute without using the court system, judges or juries.”

James Del., EXHIBIT “A.”

In reviewing the Arbitration Policy, the Court must be guided by the principle that arbitration agreements are favored and are to be broadly construed with doubts being resolved in favor of coverage. See AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am. (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 648-650; Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25. In this light, the Arbitration Policy is clearly broad enough to cover the disputes at issue.

B. The Arbitration Agreement is Enforceable Under California Contract Law

JAMES expects that, notwithstanding the enforceability and validity of the arbitration agreements, WELLS FARGO will argue that those agreements are unenforceable. As the parties asserting any defenses to the agreements, WELLS FARGO has the burden of proof. Cal. Evid. Code § 500; Engalla, 15 Cal.4th at 972; Rosenthal, 14 Cal. 4th at 413; Szetela v. Discover Bank (2002) 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1099, rev denied.

C. The Court Should Issue an Order Staying This Action and Compelling WELLS FARGO to Submit it’s Claims to Final and Binding Arbitration Pursuant to it’s Arbitration Agreement With JAMES.

The Court is required to stay the action pending resolution of this motion to compel arbitration. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1281.4. In addition, the court should issue an order compelling WELLS FARGO to submit its claims to final and binding arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration policy and staying this action pending arbitration. Id., 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4. As fully set forth above, a binding and enforceable agreement to arbitrate their claims clearly exists. Accordingly, the Court should order WELLS FARGO to submit its claims to binding arbitration and stay this action until arbitration is completed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, JAMES respectfully requests that the Court stay this action pending the resolution of this Motion. JAMES further requests that the Court enter an order staying the action and compelling Plaintiffs to submit their remaining claims to final binding arbitration pursuant to GENERIC BANK’s Arbitration Policy.

Dated: January 31, 2012

JAME JAMES,

Defendant In Pro Per

The best arguments for continuing the trial date are that the other side has failed to provide requested documents or interrogatory responses, or has failed to appear for deposition. Another good ground is unavailability of a party due to injury, illness, or other conflicts. Finally, you can argue that there has been a “significant unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial”. This can include a newly discovered witness, document, or other evidence, especially when presented by the other side.

Begin your ex parte motion with the Declaration.  The Declaration must present clear and convincing evidence that the court must hear this matter immediately or irreparable harm will occur and there will be immediate danger. Legal writing is persuasive writing.  It’s all in the sales and marketing.

Trial continuances are difficult to obtain. As such, a party should always assume the case will go to trial on the date it is set, and should never count on a continuance being granted. However, if a continuance is reasonable, and in the interests of justice, judges will sometimes grant them. However, prudent counsel will never count on a continuance, and should always be prepared to try a case on the date set for trial.

A client called me on Saturday evening and had me do this ex parte for the following Tuesday morning.

NOTICE OF EX PARTE MOTION AND EX PARTE MOTION OF DEFENDANT GREG JONES TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE

TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on February 24, 2012 at 8:30 a.m or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, in Department B 96 of this court, defendant GREG JONES will and hereby does move for a four week continuance of the trial date currently set for February 24, 2012, and to continue pretrial discovery dates to coincide with the new trial date.

Said motion will be made on the grounds that 1.) Defendant GREG JONES must take his minor child to a long standing medical appointment, 2.) This is a title dispute between private individuals and a current copy of the recorded deed is necessary to resolve this matter. 3.) Defendants witnesses will also need a four week continuance, 4.) This is not a landlord tenant dispute and the court does not have jurisdiction over this matter.

This Application is based upon Code of Civil Procedure, Section 1054 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.20, which authorize the Court to extend time within which an act is required by law to be done, and upon California Rules of Court, Rules 3.1200 to 3.1207 which set forth the requirements of an Ex parte application.

This ex parte motion is based upon this Notice of Ex Parte Motion and Motion, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, the Declaration of GREG JONES and the Declaration of Joseph Schmotzren.

Dated: January 23, 2012 Respectfully submitted,

GREG JONES

Plaintiff In Pro Per

——————————————————————————-

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT

OF EX PARTE MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE

I.

INTRODUCTION

This lawsuit concerns a real estate transaction between plaintiff and defendants, precisely, the non-traditional short sale of defendants’s residence located at 6543 Baldwin Court, Los Angeles, CA 90012. In 2011, Plaintiff AMOS DIMINCHIO (“DIMINCHIO”) and defendant GREG JONES (“JONES”) entered into an agreement whereby JONES paid DIMINCHIO $305,000 in cash and jewelry to purchase JONES’s home as a short sale. As a commission JONES also gave DIMINCHIO $12,000 and the attorney handling the transaction $8,000 for a total of $325,000 in cash and jewelry. DIMINCHIO purchased defendant’s residence and then breached the agreement by quit claiming the property 95% to his brother and 5% to himself.

DIMINCHIO is in fact the cause of this title dispute with defendants and has filed the instant unlawful detainer lawsuit as retaliation for defendants attempts to remedy this problem. A true and correct copy of the October 31, 2011 affidavit I sent plaintiff in an attempt to resolve this matter is attached hereto as EXHIBIT “A”.

JONES has requested the necessary documents from the Los Angeles County Recorder’s office to prove that he is in fact the title holder to the subject property. However, on February 24, 2012 JONES has a medical appointment to take his minor children to the doctor for an important medical examination. This important medical appointment was made on December 25, 2012.

On January 23, 2012 at 10:30 a.m. JONES telephoned plaintiff’s counsel of record, Stanley Lebowski in an informal attempt to meet and confer to resolve this calendar conflict. The health of JONES’s minor children will be placed in immediate danger and irreparably harmed if this trial is not continued. JONES’s witnesses will also need a four week extension of the trial date. (See, declaration of JONES).

II.

THE COURT IS AUTHORIZED TO EXTEND TIME TO EXTEND THE TRIAL DATE

“When an act to be done, as provided in this code, relates to the pleadings in the action, or the preparation of bills of exceptions, or of amendments thereto, or to the service of notices other than of appeal and of intention to move far a new trial, the time allowed therefor, unless otherwise expressly provided, may be extended, upon good cause shown, by the judge of the court in which the action is pending, or by the judge who presided at the trial of the action; but the extension so allowed shall not exceed 30 days, without the consent of the adverse party.”

Code Civ. Proc. §1054(a).

“In all cases in which the court or judge is authorized by this section to grant an extension of time, the extension of time shall be granted when all attorneys of record of parties who have appeared in the action agree in writing to the extension of time, and any extension of time previously granted by stipulation of all attorneys of record of parties who have appeared in the action shall not be included in the computation of the 30-day limitation upon extensions of time allowed by the court or judge.”

Code Civ. Proc. §1054(b).

“An application for an order extending time must disclose in writing the nature of the case and what extensions, if any, have previously been granted by order of court or stipulation of counsel.”

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.20(b).

Good cause exists because only a recorded copy of the deed can prove who owns 6543 Baldwin Court, Los Angeles, CA 90012. Defendant must take his children to an important medical examination, and defendant’s witnesses will not be available for another four weeks. Therefore a four week extension is in the interest of justice. (See, declaration of JONES).

III.

EX PARTE RELIEF IS WARRANTED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES

As stated in the Declaration of GREG JONES filed herewith, JONES’s children will suffer irreparable harm and be placed in immediate danger unless the court grants ex parte relief rather than setting the matter for hearing on noticed motion.” (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1202(c).)

IV.

COUNSEL HAS FULLY COMPLIED WITH CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, RULE 379

Among other provisions, California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1203(a) provides as follows:

“A party seeking an ex parte order must notify all parties no later than 10:00 a.m. the court day before the ex parte appearance, absent a showing of exceptional circumstances.”

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1203(a).

“An ex parte application must be accompanied by a declaration regarding notice stating:

(1) The notice given, including the date, time, manner, and name of the party informed, the relief sought, any response, and whether opposition is expected and that, within the applicable time under rule 3.1203, the applicant informed the opposing party where and when the application would be made;

(2) That the applicant in good faith attempted to inform the opposing party but was unable to do so, specifying the efforts made to inform the opposing party; or

(3) That, for reasons specified, the applicant should not be required to inform the opposing party.”

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1204(b).

As stated in the Declaration of Joseph Schmotzren, filed herewith, counsel has duly complied with the notice requirements of California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1204.

V.

CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing facts and authorities, and the matters set forth in the Declaration of GREG JONES filed herewith, Defendant GREG JONES hereby submits that good cause exists for an ex parte order granting the requested extension of time, and respectfully requests that the Court grant an extension of time up to and including February 24, 2012.

Dated: January 23, 2012 Respectfully submitted,

DECLARATION OF GREG JONES IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE

I, GREG JONES, am the respondent in this matter, have personal knowledge of each of the following facts, and if called upon to do so I could and would competently testify that:

1 . I am one of the pro per defendants in this unlawful detainer lawsuit and I make this declaration in support of defendant GREG JONES’s Ex Parte Motion to Continue Trial Date in this matter.

2 . This action is a business dispute in a private party agreement to redeem my personal residence at 9876 Baldwin Avenue via short sale purchase by plaintiff DELFINO RUBINSKI.

3 . Plaintiff DELFINO RUBINSKI is in fact in breach of the agreement between plaintiff and defendants that is the underlying cause of this matter. A true and correct copy of the April 1, 2011 affidavit I sent plaintiff in an attempt to resolve this matter is attached hereto as EXHIBIT “A”.

4 . On February 24, 2012 I have a medical appointment to take my minor children to the doctor for an iulmportant medical examination.

5 . This important medical appointment was made on November 20, 2011.

6 . On January 23, 2012 at 10:20 a.m. I telephoned plaintiff’s counsel of record, Lebowski Garcia in an informal attempt to meet and confer to resolve this calendar conflict and set a new trial date. I spoke to Berli and she said she would give my message to Mr. Zaka.

7 . The health of my minor children will be placed in immediate danger and irreparably harmed if I do not both transport them to and attend this medical appointment on February 24, 2012.

8 . Because this lawsuit involves the private party re-financing of Defendant GREG JONES’s residence located at 8401 Nestle Avenue, the only way this matter can be resolved is when defendant GREG JONES receives his copy of the recorded deed from Los Angeles County.

9 . I have been informed by the Los Angles County Recorder’s office that I will need four weeks continuance in this trial date.

10 . My witnesses will also need a four week extension in the trial date.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California on February 23, 2012, that the foregoing is true and correct.

GREG JONES

Declarant

There you have it.  Take it.  Use it.  Tear it apart.

Ex parte motions, applications, and hearings are the rush service of the legal proceeding business.  To be a good legal document assistant, you have to be competent with your ex parte motions in a busy law office these days. However, more and more pro per and pro se clients are calling me for ex parte hearings to continue trial and other complex ex parte motions also.  Good grounds are required to continue a trial, especially if you are trying to continue an unlawful detainer or eviction trial.  Good grounds are needed for your ex parte also.  Be prepared to face opposition.  There is much more required than just giving 24 hours notice to the court and to the other side.

1. Couldn’t they have used a paralegal . . . well . . . maybe two paralegals?

LOS ANGELES — A Los Angeles judge has ratified a binding agreement between outgoing Dodgers owner Frank McCourt and his former wife Jamie McCourt in their divorce case.

Superior Court Judge Scott Gordon on Thursday signed off on the settlement reached in November that calls for Frank McCourt to pay his ex-wife $131 million by the end of April.

Frank McCourt and Major League Baseball agreed late last year that the Dodgers and the team’s media rights would be sold. The team filed for bankruptcy protection in June after the league rejected a television contract with Fox.

Among those who have expressed interest in buying the Dodgers is a group that includes former manager Joe Torre and another group with ex-Los Angeles Lakers star Magic Johnson.
Copyright 2012 by The Associated Press